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Information in the Tails of the Distribution of 
Analysts’ Quarterly Earnings Forecasts
Cameron Truong, Philip B. Shane, and Qiuhong Zhao 
Investors generally measure earnings announcement news on the basis of the difference between actual earnings 
and two salient benchmarks: earnings in the same quarter the previous year and a consensus drawn from a 
distribution of forecasts by financial analysts. We evaluate the implications of a third salient benchmark: the 
most optimistic forecast when actual earnings exceed the consensus and the most pessimistic forecast when 
the consensus exceeds actual earnings. We find that considering the information in these tails of the distribu-
tion of analysts’ earnings forecasts enhances the profitability of post–earnings announcement drift strategies.
In our study, we investigated the stock price reac-tion to information in the tails of the distribution of financial analysts’ quarterly earnings forecasts. 
As we know from the literature and the business 
press, the market’s assessment of the news in a com-
pany’s quarterly earnings announcement depends on 
the difference between actual earnings and two salient 
benchmarks: actual earnings in the same quarter the 
previous year and a consensus drawn from a distribu-
tion of analysts’ forecasts leading up to the quarterly 
earnings announcement. In our study, we evaluated 
the implications of a third salient benchmark: the most 
optimistic forecast when actual earnings exceed the 
consensus and the most pessimistic forecast when the 
consensus exceeds actual earnings. We found that the 
market absorbs some but not all of the information in 
these tail forecasts; therefore, considering the informa-
tion in the tails of the distribution of analysts’ quar-
terly earnings forecasts enhances the profitability of 
momentum trading strategies that are based on quar-
terly earnings news.1 
We refer to the most optimistic/pessimistic fore-
cast as the tail forecast and to the difference between 
actual earnings and the tail forecast as the tail fore-
cast error. We would expect the tail forecast error 
to contain incremental value-relevant information. 
Let us assume that actual earnings beat (miss) the 
consensus by a relatively large amount but that the 
most optimistic (pessimistic) forecast is much closer 
to or perhaps even above (below) actual earnings. In 
that case, the consensus and tail forecast errors present 
very different versions of earnings news, leading 
us to predict a somewhat muted market reaction to 
the traditional consensus-based measure of earnings 
news. Now consider the case in which actual earn-
ings differ from the consensus forecast by a similarly 
large amount and the tail forecast is relatively close 
to the consensus. In this case, the consensus and tail 
forecast errors present largely consistent informa-
tion, leading us to predict a stronger market reaction 
to the traditional consensus-based measure of earn-
ings news. Moreover, in a market that incorporates 
information with a lag, we would expect a more pro-
nounced post–earnings announcement drift (PEAD) 
in the case of relatively more consistent consensus 
and tail forecast errors.
Our empirical evidence suggests that the tails 
of the forecast distribution contribute economically 
and statistically significant information about the 
quality of the traditional measure of earnings sur-
prise.2 Using a sample of 126,205 company-quarters 
from the first quarter of 1987 to the second quarter of 
2012, we found that companies with large tail fore-
cast errors in the same direction as the consensus 
forecast errors experience significantly larger con-
temporaneous price reactions to consensus forecast 
errors and a significantly larger PEAD. We found 
similar results using tail forecast error in combina-
tion with unexpected earnings based on (1) a forecast 
from a quarterly seasonal random walk time-series 
model or (2) the stock price response around the 
earnings announcement.3 Consistent with Livnat 
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and Mendenhall (2006) and Lerman, Livnat, and 
Mendenhall (2007), in our sample, a hedge portfolio 
with a long position in stocks in the top quintile of 
the distribution of forecast errors (based on expecta-
tions from both the seasonal random walk model 
and the consensus analyst forecast) and a short 
position in stocks with similarly derived bottom 
quintile quarterly forecast errors generates a 2.41% 
excess return in the next quarter. This hedge return 
increases to 4.43% when the long (short) positions 
are confined to stocks in the top (bottom) quintile of 
the tail forecast error distribution.
Because we based all portfolio rankings on cut-
off values from the previous quarter, our results are 
free from look-ahead bias. Appendix A describes our 
robustness tests, showing that our results hold after 
controlling for various risk measures, proxies for 
information uncertainty, transaction costs, and other 
documented anomalies.4 As discussed in Appendix 
A, we observed higher abnormal trading volume 
after earnings announcements of companies experi-
encing larger tail forecast errors in the same direction 
as the consensus forecast errors. All the evidence 
points to the conclusion that tail forecast error cap-
tures substantial earnings information not captured 
by conventional measures of earnings surprise.
Our results are of interest to both researchers and 
practitioners. Researchers examining the contempo-
raneous/delayed market reaction to nonearnings 
information while controlling for the contemporane-
ous/delayed market reaction to earnings informa-
tion should use all three proxies for unexpected earn-
ings described in this article to avoid understating 
the market reaction to earnings news and overstating 
the market reaction to other information (see, e.g., 
Affleck-Graves and Mendenhall 1992; Bhushan 1994; 
Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok 1996; Collins and 
Hribar 2000; Bartov, Radhakrishnan, and Krinsky 
2000; Mendenhall 2004; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, 
and Schipper 2004). Our study also contributes to 
the literature on analyst behavior and market effi-
ciency in establishing that when tail forecasts deviate 
significantly from the consensus, one observes less 
underreaction to earnings news. For practitioners 
who aim to exploit PEAD, using all three measures 
of unexpected earnings helps generate significantly 
larger excess returns with a more concentrated trad-
ing portfolio. Our study provides strong empirical 
support for the practice of improving on consensus 
forecasts to seek investable opportunities.5 Finally, 
our findings offer further evidence that PEAD is 
probably due not to researcher error in measuring 
risk-adjusted returns but, rather, to economic or 
behavioral analyst/investor biases (see, e.g., Raedy, 
Shane, and Yang 2006; Cen, Hilary, and Wei 2013).
Predictions
Measures of earnings news generally require two 
inputs: a proxy for the market’s definition of actual 
value-relevant earnings and a proxy for the best 
expectation of those earnings. Several studies have 
found evidence of both a contemporaneous and a 
delayed market reaction to earnings news, calculated 
as actual current-quarter earnings minus earnings for 
the same quarter of the previous year (e.g., Freeman 
and Tse 1989; Bernard and Thomas 1990; Chordia and 
Shivakumar 2006). Other studies have used a consen-
sus measure of analyst earnings forecasts from Value 
Line or I/B/E/S to proxy for the market’s expectation 
of actual value-relevant earnings (e.g., Abarbanell and 
Bernard 1992; Chan et al. 1996; Shane and Brous 2001; 
Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn 2002; Kasznik and McNichols 
2002; Liang 2003; Mendenhall 2004; Ramnath, Rock, 
and Shane 2005). Traditional measures of expected 
earnings focus on measures of central tendency. In our 
study, we focused on incremental information in the 
tails of the distribution of analysts’ forecasts, defining 
our scaled tail forecast–based unexpected earnings 
measure, SUETAIL, as follows:
SUETAILit = (Eit – MAXit)/Pit × (POST)  
                        + (Eit – MINit)/Pit × (1 – POST), 
(1)
where 
MAXit (MINit) =  the maximum (minimum) 
I/B/E/S analyst forecast in 
the 90-day period before the 
earnings announcement date
 POST =  a dummy that takes the value of 
1 if the consensus forecast–based 
unexpected earnings (Eit – Fit) is 
greater than or equal to 0 and 
takes the value of 0 otherwise
 Eit = quarterly earnings per I/B/E/S
 Fit =  the consensus analyst forecast
We scaled the numerator by the price per share 
for stock i at the end of quarter t. Equation 1 is best 
illustrated with the following two examples.
Suppose that both Company A and Company B 
have equivalent positive forecast errors (computed 
by using a recent consensus of analysts’ forecasts) 
but have different forecast errors computed by using 
the most optimistic forecast in the distribution from 
which the consensus forecast emerged.6
Although the two companies have the same con-
sensus forecast errors (30 cents), the actual earnings 
of Company B beat the most optimistic forecast by 
29 cents whereas the actual earnings of Company 
A beat the most optimistic forecast by only 5 cents. 
Thus, one analyst managed to predict actual earn-
ings very well for Company A, and that analyst’s 
clients might act on this superior prediction before 
the earnings announcement, leaving little room for 
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additional price movement concurrent with the 
earnings announcement. We hypothesize that the 
positive consensus-based forecast error for Company 
B conveys more positive earnings news than the 
consensus-based forecast error for Company A 
because, relative to Company A, Company B’s earn-
ings beat the most optimistic forecast in the distribu-
tion by a much larger amount.
Changing Example 1 slightly, let us assume that 
the most optimistic forecast for Company A is 1.05. 
The earnings forecast error based on the consensus 
(30 cents) would indicate a positive earnings sur-
prise, whereas the earnings forecast error based on 
the most optimistic forecast (–5 cents) would indicate 
a negative earnings surprise. Here, the market may 
be disappointed because actual earnings fall short 
of the most optimistic forecast even though actual 
earnings beat the consensus by a large margin.7
Now suppose that Company A and Company 
B have equivalent negative earnings surprises (com-
puted by using a recent consensus of analysts’ fore-
casts) but have different forecast errors computed by 
using the most pessimistic forecast in the distribution 
from which the consensus forecast emerged.
Although the two companies have the same con-
sensus forecast errors (–50 cents), the actual earnings 
of Company B fall short of the most pessimistic forecast 
by 45 cents whereas the actual earnings of Company 
A exceed the most pessimistic forecast by 5 cents. 
Therefore, we conjecture that the negative surprise for 
Company B conveys more negative information than 
the negative surprise for Company A because, relative 
to Company A, Company B’s earnings fall short of the 
most pessimistic forecast by a larger amount. In fact, 
relative to at least one extremely pessimistic forecast, 
Company B’s earnings news is positive.
Under these examples, our first hypothesis pre-
dicts that the magnitude of the market reaction to 
earnings announcements characterized by positive 
(negative) consensus forecast errors increases with 
increases (decreases) in tail forecast errors that are 
measured with respect to the most optimistic (pes-
simistic) forecast in the distribution from which the 
consensus emerged.
Our second hypothesis evaluates PEAD as a func-
tion of earnings news. It predicts that the magnitude of 
the drift in stock prices following earnings announce-
ments characterized by positive (negative) consensus 
forecast errors increases with increases (decreases) in 
tail forecast errors that are measured with respect to 
the most optimistic (pessimistic) forecast in the distri-
bution from which the consensus emerged.
Research Design
We evaluated three measures of unexpected earn-
ings in terms of their relationship with both the 
contemporaneous stock price reaction to earnings 
announcements and PEAD. Consistent with many 
prior studies, we obtained our first measure of 
unexpected earnings, SUE, from a rolling seasonal 
random walk model. Our second measure, SUECF, 
is based on the traditional measure of consensus 
analyst forecast error from I/B/E/S, whereby unex-
pected earnings equals actual quarterly earnings less 
the median forecast during a 90-day period leading 
up to the earnings announcement. Our third mea-
sure, SUETAIL, is defined as in Equation 1. We scaled 
all three measures by price as of the end of the fiscal 
quarter to which the earnings announcement refers.
Example 1.  
Company A Company B
Earnings 1.00 Earnings 1.00
Consensus earnings forecast 0.70 Consensus earnings forecast 0.70
Consensus forecast error 0.30 Consensus forecast error 0.30
Earnings 1.00 Earnings 1.00
Most optimistic forecast 0.95 Most optimistic forecast 0.71
Tail forecast error 0.05 Tail forecast error 0.29
Example 2.  
Company A Company B
Earnings 0.50 Earnings 0.50
Consensus earnings forecast 1.00 Consensus earnings forecast 1.00
Consensus forecast error –0.50 Consensus forecast error –0.50
Earnings 0.50 Earnings 0.50
Most pessimistic forecast 0.45 Most pessimistic forecast 0.95
Tail forecast error +0.05 Tail forecast error –0.45
Information in the Tails of the Distribution of Analysts’ Quarterly Earnings Forecasts
September/October 2016 www.cfapubs.org  87
To mitigate effects of outliers and nonlinearities, 
we decile-ranked SUE, SUECF, and SUETAIL and 
transformed the decile ranks to fall along a scale 
between 0 and 1. To eliminate any look-ahead bias, 
we used the ranking cutoffs from the previous quar-
ter to assign stocks to one of 10 portfolios on the basis 
of SUE, SUECF, or SUETAIL in the current quarter, 
resulting in the rank variables DSUE, DSUECF, and 
DSUETAIL. The advantage of this method is that by 
regressing PEAD on these transformed variables, the 
coefficients on DSUE, DSUECF, and DSUETAIL can 
be interpreted as the return earned on an equally 
weighted portfolio that takes long positions in the 
top decile of the variable and short positions in the 
bottom decile of the variable.
Our primary motivation for SUETAIL was to 
provide information that supplements the informa-
tion in SUECF or SUE such that the market reac-
tion and PEAD associated with the interaction of 
SUECF and SUETAIL or the interaction of SUE and 
SUETAIL are stronger than the market reaction 
and PEAD associated with SUECF or SUE alone. 
Although our results confirm this prediction, we 
also found that a hedge portfolio trading strategy 
based on SUETAIL alone produces significant posi-
tive abnormal returns.
To examine the role of each surprise measure in 
relation to the contemporaneous market reaction to 
the news in an earnings announcement and PEAD, 
we estimated the following models:
CAR Intercept DSUE
DSUECF DSUETAIL
i q i q
i q i q
a a
a
u
, ,
, ,
= + × +
× + ×
+
1 2
3
 
(2)
PEAD Intercept DSUE
DSUECF DSUETAIL
i q i q
i q i q
a a
a
u
, ,
, ,
= + × +
× + ×
+
1 2
3  
(3)
CAR is a three-day buy-and-hold excess return 
surrounding each earnings announcement, and 
PEAD is a buy-and-hold excess return from day +2 
following the earnings announcement through the 
day following the next quarter’s earnings announce-
ment or through the day +100 when the date of the 
next quarterly earnings announcement is missing 
(Berkman and Truong 2009). Buy-and-hold excess 
return is computed as the difference between raw 
return and the return on a portfolio of companies 
matched on size and book-to-market value.
To implement our tests of the hypotheses that 
SUETAIL adds value in explaining both the con-
temporaneous market reaction to the news in an 
earnings announcement and the drift in returns fol-
lowing the earnings announcement, we estimated 
the following models:
CAR Intercept DSUE
DSUE DSUETAIL
i q i q
i q i q
a a
u
, ,
, ,
= + × +
× × +
1 2
 (4)
CAR Intercept DSUECF
DSUECF DSUETAIL
i q i q
i q i q
a a
u
, ,
, ,
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× × +
1 2
 (5)
PEAD Intercept DSUE
DSUE DSUETAIL
i q i q
i q i q
a a
u
, ,
, ,
= + × +
× × +
1 2
 (6)
PEAD Intercept DSUECF
DSUECF DSUETAIL
i q i q
i q i q
a a
u
, ,
, ,
= + × +
× × +
1 2
 (7)
We report our results from the regressions we 
conducted, with standard errors of coefficients clus-
tered by company and quarter (Petersen 2009; Gar, 
Ormazabal, and Taylor 2010; Thompson 2011).
Results
We report and discuss our results with respect to 
descriptive statistics, contemporaneous market 
responses to earnings surprises, and market effi-
ciency regarding the three earnings news proxies.
Descriptive Statistics. Table 1 outlines the 
derivation of our sample and provides descriptive 
statistics for variables included in our tests of hypoth-
eses. Panel A shows that we began with all 1,649,763 
company-quarters available from I/B/E/S from the 
first quarter of 1987 to the second quarter of 2012. 
We then applied screens to reduce the number of 
observations to those with the data needed to test our 
hypotheses. First, we eliminated observations with-
out Compustat data needed to calculate SUE (473,058 
observations). Second, we excluded observations 
without earnings announcement dates on Compustat 
(224,089 observations). Third, we reduced measure-
ment error by eliminating observations with earnings 
announcement dates (per Compustat) that were not 
within at least one day of the earnings announcement 
dates available from I/B/E/S (146,181 observations). 
Fourth, we eliminated observations without the nec-
essary price deflator from Compustat or with a price 
deflator less than $1 (40,944 observations). Fifth, we 
excluded observations with missing book or market 
values of equity or with book or market values less 
than $5 million (75,959 observations). Finally, we elim-
inated observations for which we could not obtain 
the CRSP data needed to measure CAR and PEAD 
(516,128 observations) and observations concerning 
companies without the cutoffs of SUE, SUECF, and 
SUETAIL from the previous quarter (47,199). These 
screens left us with 126,205 observations to include 
in the tests of our hypotheses.8
Panel B of Table 1 provides summary statistics of 
the variables in the main tests of our hypotheses plus 
the variable STD, which measures the dispersion in 
Financial Analysts Journal
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the distribution of forecasts from which we derived 
the median and tail forecasts for purposes of measur-
ing SUECF and SUETAIL, respectively. Our primary 
test variables—SUE, SUECF, SUETAIL, CAR, and 
PEAD—have reasonably symmetrical distributions 
around zero and substantial variability, because 
the standard deviation of each distribution is large 
relative to the mean of each distribution. The mean 
and median market values of equity are $6.35 bil-
lion and $1.30 billion, respectively. The mean and 
median market values of the price deflator are $31.19 
and $25.85, and the mean and median values of the 
measure of forecast dispersion (STD) are 0.0477 and 
0.0212. Thus, the distributions of the market values 
of equity, price, and forecasts are all skewed to the 
right, consistent with the literature.
Table 1.   Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
A. Sample selection
All I/B/E/S company-quarters with consensus forecasts from Q1:1987 to Q2:2012 1,649,763
Exclude observations without Compustat quarterly data to compute SUE –473,058
    Subtotal after merging with Compustat data 1,176,705
Exclude observations without earnings announcement dates reported in Compustat –224,089
Exclude observations where earnings announcement dates in Compustat and I/B/E/S differ by more than one 
calendar day –146,181
Exclude observations where the price per share from Compustat at fiscal quarter-end is missing or less than $1 –40,944
Exclude observations with market (or book) equity missing or less than $5 million –75,959
    Subtotal: Number of company-quarters before merging with CRSP 689,532
Exclude company-quarters without matching CRSP data needed to compute CAR and PEAD –516,128
    Subtotal: Number of company-quarters after merging with CRSP data 173,404
Exclude company-quarters without cutoffs of SUE, SUECF, and SUETAIL from the previous quarter –47,199
Number of company-quarters in the final sample 126,205
Percentile
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
B. Summary statistics of key variables
SUE 126,205 –0.0011 0.2682 –0.0222 –0.0045 0.0015 0.0055 0.0170
SUECF 126,205 –0.0013 0.0648 –0.0039 –0.0004 0.0004 0.0017 0.0046
SUETAIL 126,205 –0.0017 0.0640 –0.0038 –0.0009 0.0000 0.0010 0.0033
CAR 126,205 0.0026 0.0809 –0.0799 –0.0324 0.0014 0.0375 0.0868
PEAD 126,205 0.0027 0.2158 –0.2201 –0.1025 –0.0044 0.0934 0.2143
MV(t – 1) 126,205 6,348.91 20,923.63 182.49 450.67 1,295.13 4,018.69 12,840.20
Price 126,205 31.1932 29.1912 7.8750 14.7500 25.8500 40.4000 57.9999
STD 126,205 0.0477 0.2204 0.0057 0.0100 0.0212 0.0471 0.0968
SUE SUECF SUETAIL CAR PEAD MV(t – 1) Price STD
C. Spearman correlations among key variables
SUE 1.0000 0.2986 0.2202 0.1266 0.0289 0.0393 0.1061 –0.0660
<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
SUECF 1.0000 0.4317 0.2978 0.0444 0.0113 0.0119 –0.0025
<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.3774
SUETAIL 1.0000 0.1969 0.0322 –0.0188 0.0358 –0.0926
<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
CAR 1.0000 0.0386 0.0072 0.0233 –0.0196
<0.0001 0.0103 <0.0001 <0.0001
PEAD 1.0000 0.0393 0.0238 0.0038
<0.0001 <0.0001 0.1720
MV(t – 1) 1.0000 0.6367 0.1126
<0.0001 <0.0001
Price 1.0000 0.1373
<0.0001
STD 1.0000
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Panel C of Table 1 shows that our three proxies 
for unexpected earnings (SUE, SUETAIL, and SUECF) 
are significantly but by no means perfectly correlated, 
leaving plenty of room for each to provide incremental 
information about the company’s earnings news. Panel 
C also shows that each measure of earnings surprise 
is significantly correlated with both contemporaneous 
and future returns, providing evidence of contempo-
raneous market reactions to earnings news and PEAD 
in our sample. SUECF has the highest correlation with 
both CAR (–1,1) and PEAD, our new earnings surprise 
proxy (SUETAIL) is second in both categories, and SUE 
is third. As expected, STD (our measure of forecast dis-
persion) and SUETAIL are negatively correlated, mak-
ing STD an important control variable in our robustness 
tests. The Spearman correlation is about –9.26%, which 
is highly significant but far from perfect.9
Contemporaneous Market Response to 
Earnings Surprise. We report our results from 
regressing CAR (–1, 1) against three measures of earn-
ings surprise. As shown in Panel A of Table 2, three-
day excess returns corresponding to the top decile of 
earnings surprise exceed similarly computed returns 
related to the bottom decile of earnings surprise by 
7.17% if surprise is measured by DSUECF, 4.79% if 
measured by DSUETAIL, and 2.96% if measured by 
DSUE. The two-way-clustered t-statistics of the coeffi-
cients on the three measures are all highly significant.
As shown in the far-right column of Panel A 
(model 2), all three earnings news proxies help explain 
the variation in returns during the three-day window 
centered on the earnings announcement. Although 
DSUECF seems the best proxy, the other two mea-
sures contain information about the market’s earnings 
Table 2.   Regressions of CAR (–1,1) on DSUE, DSUECF, and DSUETAIL 
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Variable DSUECF DSUETAIL DSUE
DSUE, DSUECF, and 
DSUETAIL (Model 2)
A. Regressions of CAR (–1,1) on the levels of DSUECF, DSUETAIL, and DSUE
Intercept –0.0337 –0.0220 –0.0121 –0.0426
(–24.17) (–19.48) (–13.37) (–26.89)
DSUECF 0.0717 0.0605
(28.40) (25.85)
DSUETAIL 0.0479 0.0220
(25.74) (21.80)
DSUE 0.0296 0.0066
(22.88) (5.60)
R2 0.0784 0.0360 0.0136 0.0858
F-value 8,172.72 3,640.65 1,361.88 2,967.63
p-Value <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
N 126,205 126,205 126,205 126,205
Variable
DSUE and DSUE × 
DSUETAIL (Model 4)
DSUECF and DSUECF × 
DSUETAIL (Model 5)
B. Regressions of CAR (–1,1) on the interaction between DSUECF and DSUETAIL and the interaction 
between DSUE and DSUETAIL 
Intercept –0.0102 –0.0315
(–11.45) (–23.05)
DSUE –0.0096
(–5.37)
DSUE × DSUETAIL 0.0633
(26.14)
DSUECF 0.0514
(21.06)
DSUECF × DSUETAIL 0.0269
(17.46)
R2 0.0350 0.0823
F-value 1,813.19 4,305.33
p-Value <0.0001 <0.0001
N 126,205 126,205
Financial Analysts Journal
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surprise that DSUECF does not. There is a hierarchy 
regarding the power to explain contemporaneous 
market reaction: DSUECF is the strongest (coefficient 
= 0.0605; t-statistic = 25.85), followed by DSUETAIL 
(coefficient = 0.0220; t-statistic = 21.80) and then DSUE 
(coefficient = 0.0066; t-statistic = 5.60).
Panel B of Table 2 shows the results of estimat-
ing models 4 and 5—testing the hypothesis that 
the contemporaneous market reaction to an earn-
ings announcement increases with the magnitude 
of the interaction between (1) DSUE and our new 
measure of earnings surprise, DSUETAIL, and (2) 
DSUECF and DSUETAIL. As shown in Panel B, the 
interaction terms, DSUE × DSUETAIL and DSUECF 
× DSUETAIL, are highly significant, suggesting that 
the contemporaneous market response to consensus 
analyst forecast errors or to time-series model fore-
cast errors increases with the degree to which the 
most optimistic/pessimistic forecast conforms to the 
consensus. This result supports our first prediction.
Market Efficiency regarding Three Earnings 
News Proxies. Table 3 reports the results of 
regressing the PEAD against four measures of earn-
ings surprise. Brandt, Kishore, Santa-Clara, and 
Venkatachalam (2008) and Zhou and Zhu (2012) 
documented that a trading strategy based on long 
(short) positions in the top (bottom) quintile of stocks 
sorted on abnormal earnings announcement returns 
(EAR) earns significant abnormal returns in the post–
earnings announcement period.10 We thus included 
EAR as the fourth earnings surprise measure, regard-
ing the stock price response in the three-day window 
surrounding the earnings announcement.
Coefficients on the earnings surprise proxies pro-
vide estimates of gains to a trading strategy taking 
long (short) positions in stocks in the top (bottom) 
decile of the earnings surprise proxy distribution. 
From day +2 following the earnings announcement 
through the day following the next quarter’s earnings 
announcement—or day +100 when the date of the 
next quarterly earnings announcement is missing—
the trading strategy produces an estimated 2.69% 
return when surprise is measured by SUECF, 1.67% 
when measured by SUETAIL, 1.30% when mea-
sured by SUE, and 2.34% when measured by EAR. 
Model 3 in Panel A of Table 3 shows that DSUECF 
and DSUETAIL contribute statistically significant 
power in explaining the drift in returns following 
the earnings announcement. The regression coeffi-
cients suggest that one could earn an approximately 
3.41% quarterly return on a strategy that takes long 
positions in stocks in the highest decile of all three 
measures of earnings surprise and a short position in 
the lowest decile of those measures. Our DSUETAIL 
measure contributes a unique 0.65% abnormal hedge 
portfolio return, which is 19% of the estimated total 
hedge portfolio return. For further comparisons, the 
far-right column of Panel A shows that when all four 
earnings surprise measures are included, DSUETAIL 
retains its important contribution to the abnormal 
hedge portfolio return.
Model 7 in Panel B of Table 3 shows that when 
PEAD is regressed on DSUECF and the interaction of 
DSUECF and DSUETAIL, we obtain a 1.73% abnor-
mal return to a trading strategy based on long (short) 
positions in stocks in the top (bottom) decile of SUECF 
alone, which increases significantly to 3% (= 1.73% + 
1.27%) when the strategy is confined to stocks also in 
the top (bottom) decile of the SUETAIL distribution. 
The coefficient on the interaction term is highly sig-
nificant, with a t-statistic of 2.58 (p-value < 0.01). This 
result confirms our second hypothesis, which predicts 
that the amount of PEAD increases significantly with 
the interaction of DSUECF (the traditional measure 
of earnings surprise) and DSUETAIL (our new mea-
sure based on tail forecasts in the distribution from 
which the consensus emerges). Model 6 in Panel B 
confirms similar interactive power between DSUE 
and DSUETAIL. The spread between companies in 
the top SUE decile and companies in the bottom SUE 
decile increases from –0.34% to 2.31% when the trad-
ing strategy is confined to companies also in the top 
and bottom SUETAIL deciles. The interaction term is 
highly significant, with a t-statistic of 5.53. The model 
in the far-right column of Panel B shows that when 
DEAR interacts with DSUETAIL, the spread between 
companies in the top EAR decile and companies in 
the bottom EAR decile increases from 0.86% to 3.28%. 
Again, the interaction term is highly significant, with 
a t-statistic of 5.18, providing further evidence of the 
importance of DSUETAIL in assessing PEAD.
Table 4 reports our analysis of hedge portfolio 
PEAD returns in relation to different combinations 
of the three primary earnings news proxies. Panel A 
shows our analysis of PEAD for various combina-
tions of the DSUECF and DSUETAIL variables. We 
obtain statistically significant hedge portfolio quar-
terly returns of 1.51%, 2.03%, and 2.17% with long 
(short) positions in stocks in the top (bottom) quintile 
of the distribution of SUECF while holding SUETAIL 
constant. Thus, the average return to a SUECF-based 
trading strategy that holds SUETAIL constant is only 
1.90%, compared with 3.39% for a trading strategy 
that takes long (short) positions in stocks whose SUE 
and SUETAIL are in the top (bottom) quintile of their 
respective distribution.11
Panel B of Table 4 shows hedge portfolio quarterly 
returns of 0.78%, 0.65%, and 2.13% for long (short) 
positions in the top (bottom) quintile of the distribu-
tion of SUE, with SUETAIL held constant. Thus, the 
average return to a SUE-based trading strategy that 
holds SUETAIL constant is only 1.19%, compared with 
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3.22% for a trading strategy that takes long (short) 
positions in stocks whose SUE and SUETAIL are in the 
top (bottom) quintile of their respective distribution.
Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) and Lerman et al. 
(2007) suggested that using SUECF and SUE simul-
taneously results in the highest PEAD hedge return. 
Following this suggestion, we restricted the sample 
in Panel C of Table 4 to observations whose quintile 
rankings of SUECF and SUE agree and assessed the 
incremental effect of considering the quintile rank 
of SUETAIL. Holding SUETAIL constant, we found 
significant returns to a trading strategy that takes long 
(short) positions in stocks whose SUECF and SUE 
are both in the top (bottom) quintile of their respec-
tive distribution. These quarterly returns are 1.38%, 
2.36%, and 3.49%, respectively, when SUETAIL is in 
the bottom, middle, and top quintiles of its distribu-
tion. Thus, the average return to a trading strategy 
based simultaneously on SUECF and SUE that holds 
SUETAIL constant is 2.41%. The hedge return jumps 
Table 3.   Regressions of PEAD on DSUE, DSUECF, DSUETAIL, and DEAR 
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Variable DSUECF DSUETAIL DSUE DEAR
DSUE, DSUECF, 
and DSUETAIL 
(Model 3)
DSUE, DSUECF, 
DSUETAIL, and 
DEAR
A. Regressions of PEAD on the levels of DSUE, DSUECF, DSUETAIL, and DEAR
Intercept –0.0109 –0.0058 –0.0037 –0.0089 –0.0145 –0.0196
(–2.59) (–1.42) (–0.64) (–2.03) (–2.42) (–3.04)
DSUECF 0.0269 0.0228 0.0186
(6.37) (5.35) (4.18)
DSUETAIL 0.0167 0.0065 0.0052
(5.63) (2.56) (2.10)
DSUE 0.0130 0.0048 0.0042
(1.91) (0.68) (0.60)
DEAR 0.0234 0.0165
(6.78) (5.00)
R2 0.0015 0.0006 0.0003 0.0012 0.0016 0.0022
F-value 151.54 59.56 34.98 116.07 55.78 54.92
p-Value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
N 126,205 126,205 126,205 126,205 126,205 126,205
Variable
DSUE and DSUE × DSUETAIL 
(Model 6)
DSUECF and DSUECF × 
DSUETAIL (Model 7)
DEAR and DEAR × 
DSUETAIL
B. Regressions of PEAD on the interactions between DSUECF and DSUETAIL, between DSUE and DSUETAIL, and between DEAR 
and DSUETAIL
Intercept –0.0029 –0.0098 –0.0082
(–0.51) (–2.43) (–1.88)
DSUE –0.0034
(–0.45)
DSUE × DSUETAIL 0.0265
(5.53)
DSUECF 0.0173
(3.66)
DSUECF × DSUETAIL 0.0127
(2.58)
DEAR 0.0086
(2.32)
DEAR × DSUETAIL 0.0242
(5.18)
R2 0.0009 0.0016 0.0016
F-value 45.01 83.36 80.54
p-Value <0.001 <0.001 <0.001
N 126,205 126,205 126,205
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Table 4.   Post–Earnings Announcement Drift Based on DSUECF, DSUE, and DSUETAIL 
(t-statistics in parentheses)
DSUETAIL
Lowest 20% Middle 60% Highest 20% Hedge
A. PEAD based on DSUECF and DSUETAIL (N = 126,205)
DSUECF
Lowest 20% –0.0067 –0.0056 0.0053 0.0121
11,750 9,680 4,112 25,542
(–1.27) (–1.23) (0.76) (1.37)
Middle 60% 0.0069 0.0001 0.0056 –0.0012
10,885 60,220 4,468 75,573
(1.45) (0.03) (1.23) (–0.18)
Highest 20% 0.0083 0.0146 0.0271 0.0188
3,137 5,497 16,456 25,090
(1.08) (3.12) (6.90) (2.17)
Hedge 0.0151 0.0203 0.0217 0.0339
25,772 75,397 25,036 126,205
(1.61) (3.10) (2.68) (5.13)
B. PEAD based on DSUE and DSUETAIL (N = 126,205)
DSUE
Lowest 20% –0.0042 0.0000 0.0066 0.0109
10,703 9,660 5,585 25,948
(–0.64) (0.01) (0.92) (1.12)
Middle 60% –0.0001 –0.0007 0.0147 0.0150
10,214 54,891 10,282 75,387
(–0.04) (–0.33) (5.23) (3.02)
Highest 20% 0.0036 0.0065 0.0279 0.0243
4,855 10,846 9,169 24,870
(0.56) (1.56) (5.51) (2.95)
Hedge 0.0078 0.0065 0.0213 0.0322
25,772 75,397 25,036 126,205
(0.85) (0.99) (2.42) (3.87)
C. PEAD based on DSUECF = DSUE and DSUETAIL (N = 5,985)
DSUECF = DSUE
Lowest 20% –0.0080 –0.0050 0.0013 0.0094
4,265 1,742 1,284 7,291
(–0.86) (–0.60) (0.11) (0.61)
Middle 60% 0.0145 –0.0012 0.0225 0.0079
969 10,648 761 12,378
(1.58) (–0.50) (2.81) (0.65)
Highest 20% 0.0057 0.0186 0.0362 0.0304
617 1,150 4,549 6,316
(0.49) (2.16) (5.49) (2.27)
Hedge 0.0138 0.0237 0.0349 0.0443
5,851 13,540 6,594 25,985
(0.92) (1.97) (2.54) (3.85)
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to 4.43% with a trading strategy that takes long (short) 
positions in stocks whose three earnings surprise mea-
sures are in their respective top (bottom) quintile.
Taken as a whole, the evidence in Table 4 strongly 
suggests that tail forecast errors contain value-
relevant information to which the market incremen-
tally underreacts, as indicated by the delayed returns 
associated with SUETAIL in combination with the 
two conventional measures of earnings surprise—
SUE and SUECF.12
Conclusion
Quarter after quarter, earnings announcements con-
sistently rank among the most newsworthy infor-
mation events affecting the value of companies’ 
securities. Effective proxies for earnings surprise are 
important for at least two reasons. First, we have no 
theory to guide measurement of the news the market 
derives from an earnings announcement. Second, the 
search for a proxy for earnings news that the market 
fails to fully absorb leads to trading profits and, as 
those trading profits are arbitraged away, to stock 
prices that more efficiently absorb accounting infor-
mation and allocate resources in capital markets.
Our study contributes a new measure of earn-
ings surprise that affords greater understanding of 
the process by which the market forms earnings 
expectations. Our measure of earnings surprise 
complements the news derived from two conven-
tional measures: one based on consensus analyst 
forecasts and the other based on predictions from 
a seasonal random walk time-series model. We 
found that when the most optimistic/pessimistic 
forecast in the distribution of forecasts composing 
the consensus is closer to the conventionally mea-
sured forecast, the market views the conventionally 
measured earnings news as more persistent, reacting 
more strongly in the three-day window surrounding 
the earnings announcement but also underreacting 
to this incremental information as reflected by sig-
nificantly more PEAD.
Consequently, we found evidence of larger 
hedge portfolio returns to trading strategies based 
on long (short) positions in the top (bottom) deciles 
and quintiles of conventionally measured earnings 
surprise when these decile and quintile assignments are 
similar to those based on our new measure of earnings 
surprise. Appendix A shows that trading volume 
around the time of the earnings announcement sup-
plies corroborating evidence that our new measure 
of earnings surprise provides heretofore uncovered 
value-relevant information in earnings announce-
ments and in the tails of the distribution of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts leading up to quarterly earnings 
announcements.
Moreover, we found that tail forecast error contrib-
utes unique information explaining both the market’s 
contemporaneous reaction to earnings news and the 
drift in returns after the earnings announcement. Our 
results have implications for researchers seeking a bet-
ter understanding of how the market forms its earnings 
expectations, for investors seeking higher returns from 
trading on the news in earnings announcements, and 
for financial analysts seeking to improve their earnings-
based research and recommendations. Overall, this 
study improves our understanding of the process by 
which accounting information affects market prices.
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Deakin University, Louisiana State University, Monash 
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Association. Philip Shane gratefully acknowledges finan-
cial support from the Frank Wood Accounting Faculty 
Research Fund at the Raymond A. Mason School of 
Business, College of William & Mary.
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Appendix A. Additional 
Analyses and Robustness 
Tests
In this appendix, we report additional analyses 
and robustness test results regarding control vari-
ables, abnormal trading volume around earnings 
announcements, and transaction costs, as well as 
other untabled robustness tests.
Control Variables
The PEAD–SUE and PEAD–SUECF relationships 
have been shown to be sensitive to arbitrage risk 
(Mendenhall 2004), abnormal trading volume (Bhushan 
1994; Garfinkel and Sokobin 2006), revenue surprise 
(Jegadeesh and Livnat 2006), and dispersion of ana-
lysts’ forecasts (Dische 2002; Liang 2003; Garfinkel and 
Sokobin 2006). Table A1 shows that the delayed market 
reaction to the incremental information in SUETAIL 
remains significant after the inclusion of these variables 
as well as risk factors that might limit arbitrage trading.
As shown in Table A1, after adding these vari-
ables and allowing them to interact with DSUE and 
DSUECF in the same manner as our variable of 
interest, DSUETAIL, the coefficient on DSUE alone 
becomes insignificant but the coefficient on the inter-
action of DSUETAIL and both DSUE (Panel A) and 
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DSUECF (Panel B) is virtually unaffected and remains 
significant.13
Abnormal Trading Volume around 
Earnings Announcements
In addition to stock price changes, prior literature 
has analyzed trading volume as a measure of the 
market’s response to information events, includ-
ing earnings announcements. Table A2 examines 
whether abnormal trading in the earnings announce-
ment window is related to earnings information 
captured by SUETAIL. Table A2 shows that trad-
ing volume is high (low) when the information in 
SUETAIL corroborates (contradicts) the information 
in the SUE and SUECF signals.
Table A1.   Determinants of Post–Earnings Announcement Drift 
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Variable DSUETAIL DREV DARB DEXP DSTD DP DVOL Full Model
A. Regressions of PEAD on DSUE and interaction of DSUE and DSUETAIL
Intercept 0.0010 0.0003 0.0008 0.0004 0.0006 0.0007 0.0004 0.0023
(0.16) (0.05) (0.12) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11) (0.06) (0.34)
DSUE –0.0033 0.0090 0.0039 0.0124 0.0059 0.0160 0.0081 –0.0165
(–0.39) (1.10) (0.27) (1.23) (0.62) (2.26) (0.81) (–0.63)
DSUE × DSUETAIL 0.0226 0.0242
(4.47) (4.45)
DSUE × DREV 0.0032 0.0130
(0.35) (0.75)
DSUE × DARB 0.0114 0.0097
(0.64) (0.49)
DSUE × DEXP –0.0035 –0.0022
(–0.36) (–0.18)
DSUE × DSTD 0.0086 0.0118
(1.49) (1.70)
DSUE × DP –0.0117 –0.0153
(–1.03) (–0.94)
DSUE × DVOL 0.0049 0.0027
(0.49) (0.17)
N 94,479 94,479 94,479 94,479 94,479 94,479 94,479 94,479
B. Regressions of PEAD on DSUECF and interaction of DSUECF and DSUETAIL
Intercept –0.0052 –0.0060 –0.0052 –0.0060 –0.0060 –0.0050 –0.0061 –0.0033
(–1.22) (–1.35) (–1.11) (–1.39) (–1.34) (–1.02) (–1.39) (–0.63)
DSUECF 0.0157 0.0228 0.0112 0.0219 0.0235 0.0313 0.0188 –0.0033
(3.20) (3.36) (1.12) (2.63) (3.98) (4.90) (3.50) (–0.15)
DSUECF × DSUETAIL 0.0097 0.0127
(1.93) (2.45)
DSUECF × DREV 0.0002 0.0150
(0.02) (0.87)
DSUECF × DARB 0.0198 0.0178
(1.13) (0.96)
DSUECF × DEXP 0.0022 0.0046
(0.16) (0.29)
DSUECF × DSTD –0.0009 0.0057
(–0.15) (0.77)
DSUECF × DP –0.0206 –0.0214
(–1.44) (–1.12)
DSUECF × DVOL 0.0086 0.0043
(0.92) (0.28)
N 94,479 94,479 94,479 94,479 94,479 94,479 94,479 94,479
Information in the Tails of the Distribution of Analysts’ Quarterly Earnings Forecasts
September/October 2016 www.cfapubs.org  95
Transaction Costs
Table A3 reports the implications of transaction costs 
for trading on the PEAD. In Panel A, companies in 
the bottom 20% of both SUECF and SUETAIL have 
an average market capitalization of $2.06 billion, 
whereas companies in the top 20% of both SUECF 
and SUETAIL have an average market capitalization 
of $2.78 billion. In Panel B, companies in the bottom 
20% of both SUE and SUETAIL have an average mar-
ket capitalization of $2.43 billion, whereas companies 
in the top 20% of both SUE and SUETAIL have an 
average market capitalization of $2.76 billion. In 
Panel C, companies in the bottom 20% of all three 
earnings surprise measures have an average market 
capitalization of about $1.27 billion. Companies in 
the top 20% of all three earnings surprise measures 
have an average market capitalization of about $2.46 
billion. Given that the average market capitaliza-
tion of the overall sample is $6.3 billion (Table 1), 
smaller stocks tend to occupy the trading portfolios, 
but these stocks are not so small as to suggest insur-
mountable liquidity constraints. Average turnover, 
measured as trading volume on day +2 relative to 
total shares outstanding, is generally more than 1% 
across all three panels, which also suggests adequate 
liquidity for trading these companies.
To account for transaction costs and to elicit 
investable returns, Table A3 also examines PEAD 
returns after accounting for transaction costs. 
Following Chung and Zhang (2014), we used daily 
closing bid and ask prices to compute the daily 
quoted spread for each stock, and following Battalio 
and Mendenhall (2011), we assumed that investors 
pay half of the stock’s quoted bid–ask spread when 
initiating their positions (on day +2) and again pay 
half the quoted bid–ask spread when terminating 
the positions. After accounting for transaction costs, 
the hedge returns are 2.09% in Panel A and 2.05% in 
Panel B. These returns are significant at the 1% level 
and are economically large. In Panel C, the hedge 
return after transaction costs is highest at 3.19% 
and significant at the 1% level. In short, the PEAD 
strategies are still highly profitable after accounting 
for transaction costs, and the PEAD strategy that 
combines SUECF, SUE, and SUETAIL is the most 
profitable.
Table A2.   Abnormal Trading Volume around Earnings Announcement Date Based on DSUECF, 
DSUE, and DSUETAIL 
(t-statistics in parentheses)
DSUETAIL
Lowest 20% Middle 60% Highest 20% Highest 20% – Lowest 20%
A. Abnormal trading volume based on DSUECF and DSUETAIL (N = 126,205)
DSUECF
Lowest 20% 1.2838 0.8805 0.6471 –0.6367
(22.13) (22.44) (16.67) (–9.10)
Middle 60% 0.5785 0.7126 0.7121 0.1335
(18.61) (28.83) (20.84) (2.89)
Highest 20% 0.5834 0.7737 0.9187 0.3353
(17.76) (13.80) (28.27) (7.26)
B. Abnormal trading volume based on DSUE and DSUETAIL (N = 126,205)
DSUE
Lowest 20% 0.9817 0.6930 0.7153 –0.2664
(23.78) (22.93) (15.82) (–4.35)
Middle 60% 0.8495 0.7420 0.7916 –0.0579
(19.43) (28.84) (24.31) (–1.06)
Highest 20% 0.7677 0.7959 0.9659 0.1982
(19.73) (25.68) (24.24) (3.56)
C. Abnormal trading volume based on DSUECF = DSUE and DSUETAIL (N = 25,985)
DSUECF = DSUE
Lowest 20% 1.3382 0.7154 0.6509 –0.6873
(16.41) (15.29) (11.03) (–6.81)
Middle 60% 0.6363 0.6997 0.6960 0.0597
(7.82) (23.87) (12.17) (0.60)
Highest 20% 0.5909 0.7414 1.0047 0.4138
(9.31) (15.75) (22.16) (5.34)
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Other Untabled Robustness 
Tests
We also report other untabled robustness test results 
regarding opposite signs between SUETAIL and 
SUECF, the staleness of the consensus forecast, the 
exclusion of extreme returns, SUETAIL and fore-
cast dispersion, truncated tail forecasts, and annual 
performance.
Opposite Signs between SUETAIL 
and SUECF
As explained earlier, consensus forecast errors can 
have opposite signs from tail forecast errors. Out of 
our entire sample of 126,205 observations, we found 
21,827 instances (17% of the entire sample) where 
SUECF is positive and SUETAIL is negative and 
13,863 instances (11% of the entire sample) where 
SUECF is negative and SUETAIL is positive.
These cases emphasize the fact that SUETAIL does 
indeed capture unique information that differs from 
that captured by SUECF. To assess the validity of this 
statement, we ran the regression represented by the first 
model in Panel B of Table 3 and substituted a dummy 
variable for DSUETAIL, whereby the dummy takes on 
a value of 1 when SUECF and SUETAIL have opposite 
signs and 0 otherwise. As expected, we found the coef-
ficient on that variable to be significantly negative.
Zhou and Shon (2013) showed that for a significant 
portion of the population, an earnings surprise based 
on the consensus forecast is met with market reaction in 
the opposite direction of the surprise. We show another 
dimension that can, at least partially, explain why stock 
price may drop/rise on a positive/negative earnings 
surprise based on consensus forecasts.
Staleness of Consensus Forecast
The consensus forecast may be stale because of several 
old forecasts in the distribution, which raises the ques-
tion of whether information in the tails of the forecast 
distribution is incremental information or whether 
such information comes from more recent forecasts. To 
address this concern, we investigated whether tail fore-
casts provide incremental information relative to the 
most recent forecast. In doing so, we computed SUECF 
using the most recent forecast (instead of the median), 
and we redid our main analysis with SUETAIL as the 
interactive variable. We documented the significant 
interactive effects of SUETAIL on CAR and SUECF 
and on PEAD and SUECF. Hence, the incremental 
information from SUETAIL is not due to staleness in 
the consensus forecast.
Exclusion of Extreme Returns
We excluded observations in the most extreme posi-
tive and negative 0.5% of PEAD and CAR (–1, 1), and 
Table A3.   Average Market Capitalization, Turnover, and PEAD after Transaction 
Costs for Portfolios Based on DSUECF, DSUE, and DSUETAIL
Average Market Capitalization 
(millions of dollars)
Average  
Turnover
PEAD after Transaction 
Costs
A. Market capitalization, turnover, and PEAD after transaction costs for stocks from 20% bottom 
(short) and 20% top (long) of both DSUECF and SUETAIL
Short 2,060 0.0126 –0.0006
Long 2,775 0.0133 0.0203
Hedge 0.0209**
t-Statistic 3.30
B. Market capitalization, turnover, and PEAD after transaction costs for stocks from 20% bottom 
(short) and 20% top (long) of both DSUE and SUETAIL
Short 2,432 0.0132 0.0003
Long 2,762 0.0146 0.0208
Hedge 0.0205*
t-Statistic 2.54
C. Market capitalization, turnover, and PEAD after transaction costs for stocks from 20% bottom 
(short) and 20% top (long) of SUECF, SUE, and SUETAIL simultaneously
Short 1,268 0.0142 –0.0025
Long 2,460 0.0152 0.0294
Hedge 0.0319**
t-Statistic 2.86
*Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 1% level.
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our inferences remain unchanged. In fact, t-statistics 
are somewhat higher because the independent vari-
ables are less noisy. In addition, we excluded 11,250 
company-quarter observations with only two iden-
tical earnings forecasts in the 90-day period before 
the earnings announcement date, and our results 
remain robust.
SUETAIL and Forecast Dispersion
To show that our new measure of earnings news 
captures information different from that of earnings 
forecast dispersion, we substituted STD for SUE in 
Table 4. Holding SUETAIL constant, we found sig-
nificant returns to a trading strategy that takes long 
(short) positions in stocks whose SUECF and STD are 
both in the top (bottom) quintile of their respective 
distribution. These quarterly returns are 3.5%, 2.3%, 
and 2.1%, respectively, when SUETAIL is in the bot-
tom, middle, and top quintiles of its distribution. The 
hedge return jumps to 4.4% with a trading strategy 
that takes long (short) positions in stocks whose three 
variables are in their respective top (bottom) quintile.
Truncated Tail Forecasts
In another robustness test, we replaced tail forecasts 
with the 10th percentile and 90th percentile values 
from the latest forecast distribution. We required at 
least 10 latest forecasts for an earnings announce-
ment, which substantially reduced the sample size 
to 19,490 qualifying observations. This smaller 
sample is potentially important for two reasons. 
First, a single tail forecast may be due to noise or 
luck. Substituting the forecast at the 10th or 90th 
percentile captures a more general phenomenon of 
10% of the analysts having forecasts that are some 
distance removed from the consensus. As this dis-
tance increases, the quality of the consensus as a 
proxy for market expectations diminishes. Second, 
the smaller sample has practical implications from 
the perspective of large funds that confine their 
investment strategies to large-cap stocks followed 
by more sell-side analysts. Using the 10th and 90th 
percentile values to compute SUETAIL and replicat-
ing the main tests of our study, we found that the 
results are almost identical to the results for the full 
sample, with no inferences changed.
Annual Performance
We examined the profitability of trading strategies 
on an annual basis and found that trading strategies 
corresponding to the PEAD associated with prior-
quarter earnings surprises are consistently profit-
able year after year throughout our 26-year sample 
period. The hedge portfolios based on long (short) 
positions in the top (bottom) quintile of the SUE 
distribution produce positive excess returns in all 
years except 2001, 2008, and 2009. When the hedge 
portfolios combine information from SUETAIL by 
restricting the observations to those with SUETAIL 
also in the top (bottom) quintile of its distribution, 
trading profits increase in every year. We found simi-
lar evidence with respect to combinations of SUECF 
and SUETAIL and with respect to combinations of all 
three variables: SUE, SUECF, and SUETAIL.
Notes
1. Media reports of companies’ quarterly earnings generally 
include GAAP and non-GAAP measures of actual earnings for 
both the current quarter and the same quarter of the previous 
year, along with a consensus of analyst forecasts taken from a 
data aggregator, such as Thomson Reuters. Data aggregators 
maintain or contribute to freely and easily accessible websites 
with the high and low estimates in the distribution of fore-
casts from which the consensus emerges (e.g., Reuters, Yahoo! 
Finance). To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first 
to rigorously analyze the information content of quarterly 
earnings forecasts in the tails of the distribution.
       Note that we use the terms earnings news, earnings sur-
prise, unexpected earnings, and forecast error interchangeably 
in this article.
2. In our study, we identified an approach that improves on the 
consensus forecast in judging the information content of earn-
ings announcements. This approach is consistent with Beckers, 
Steliaros, and Thomson (2004), who found that active portfolio 
managers and especially buy-side analysts seek to improve on 
consensus forecasts in identifying investment opportunities.
3. Consistent with prior literature, we defined earnings surprise 
(based on a rolling seasonal random walk) as the difference 
between actual earnings for the current fiscal quarter and 
actual earnings for the same fiscal quarter of the previous 
fiscal year.
4. Several studies have documented that transaction costs are 
the main impediment to arbitraging PEAD (see, e.g., Ng, 
Rusticus, and Verdi 2008; Chordia, Goyal, Sadka, Sadka, and 
Shivakumar 2009) and that information risk mutes the stock 
price response to earnings information (Yan and Zhao 2011), 
leading to a more pronounced PEAD. In our study, using the 
best estimate of transaction costs (Chung and Zhang 2014) 
and usual proxies for information risk, such as analyst forecast 
dispersion and stock return volatility (Zhang 2006), we docu-
mented that PEAD, especially PEAD based on multiple unex-
pected earnings proxies, is not fully explained by transaction 
costs or information risk. These findings are consistent with 
Battalio and Mendenhall (2011) and Yan and Zhao (2011), who 
documented that PEAD-based trading strategies are highly 
profitable after accounting for transaction costs and informa-
tion risk.
5. Researchers analyzing minimum and maximum values have 
found many effective applications. In a capital market context, 
George and Hwang (2004) demonstrated the profitability of 
momentum trading strategies timed to buy (sell) stocks when 
they reach the new 52-week high (low) point. Although inves-
tors had already been using that information to inform their 
trading decisions, George and Hwang provided the first large-
sample scientific evidence of the importance of that widely 
available statistic. In a similar vein, our study provides the 
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first large-sample scientific evidence of the importance of earn-
ings news based on broadly available high- and low-earnings 
forecasts.
6. Although in our examples we ignored the scalar for brevity, 
in our empirical tests, we scaled all variables as described in 
Equation 1.
7. Zhou and Shon (2013) documented that more than 40% of 
earnings surprises are met by opposite-direction stock price 
reactions, suggesting that consensus forecasts are not neces-
sarily good proxies for the “true” market expectations. Our 
example illustrates, at least partially, why the market may 
react in the opposite direction of a positive earnings surprise 
based on the consensus forecast, emphasizing the need to go 
beyond the usual assumption of consensus forecasts as the 
best proxies for market expectations.
8. Our results are not unduly influenced by any particular 
industry. The sample includes 16 SIC code–defined industries, 
with the smallest (largest) representation from agriculture 
(financial services) at 0.17% (17.78%). More importantly, no 
single industry is unevenly split between the top and bottom 
deciles of SUECF or SUETAIL. For example, 17.46% (18.11%) 
of the observations in the top (bottom) decile of the SUETAIL 
distribution are from the financial services industry.
9. For our assessment of the robustness of our main results to the 
inclusion of this and other control variables, see Appendix A.
10. Brandt et al. (2008) derived EAR in the same way that we 
derived CAR (–1,1).
11. Another way to look at how the tail forecast informs a momen-
tum trader is to consider what happens if the investor/analyst 
ignores the information in SUETAIL and takes long (short) 
positions in stocks with large (small) SUECF and small (large) 
SUETAIL. In that case, the hedge portfolio return is a statisti-
cally insignificant 0.83% – 0.53% = 0.3%. Thus, large positive 
(or negative) consensus forecast errors do not justify a trading 
strategy that ignores the information in the tail of the distribu-
tion from which the consensus emerges.
12. Holding SUETAIL constant and consistent with Brandt et 
al. (2008), we found significant returns to a trading strategy 
that takes long (short) positions in stocks whose SUECF and 
EAR are both in the top (bottom) quintile of their respective 
distribution. These quarterly returns are 1.7%, 3.1%, and 3.4%, 
respectively, when SUETAIL is in the bottom, middle, and top 
quintiles of its distribution—or 2.7%, on average. The hedge 
return jumps to 5.4% with a trading strategy that takes long 
(short) positions in stocks whose three earnings surprise mea-
sures are in their respective top (bottom) quintile.
13. In an alternative specification, we added control variables used 
in Mendenhall’s (2004) PEAD determinant model. Specifically, 
our results are robust to controls for the percentage of institu-
tional ownership and the number of analyst forecasts.
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